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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
THE EX POST FACTO ASPECT OF
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
E. A. PRICHARD*
To our American brand of republican democracy the separation of
the legislative from the judiciary is both basic and definitive. The
Constitution vested in the Congress of the United States all of the legis-
lative powers delegated by the people to the national government,1 and
in the Supreme Court and such other courts as Congress should there-
after establish the Constitution vested the judicial power of the United
States. 2 The legislature cannot judge and the judges cannot legislate.
Judges can, however, make law, and they have been steadily mak-
ing law since the first year of our nation,3 whether they have admitted
it or not.4 The body of Federal court-made law (judicial precedent)
now approaches a thousand volumes.5
Some of the jurists of the past who have recognized that courts do
make law have criticized court-made law on the ground that it is
retroactive in effect, or ex post facto.6 This ex post facto aspect of court-
made law has been tolerated, however, apparently because it is a
necessary concomitant of the separation of the legislative and the
judiciary. If our judges, who cannot legislate, are to make law at all,
it must have a retroactive effect upon the case at bar. Could they, hav-
ing determined the case at bar under existing law, legislate a new rule
of solely prospective application, the objection of retroactivity could be
avoided. Such a plan would not work, of course, because of the separa-
tion of the judicial and legislative functions.
To these two classes of Federal law- Congress-made law and court-
made law, Congress has in the present century added a third category-
administrative law. This is a sort of law which does not fall readily
into the Constitutional scheme of the separation of powers, for ad-
ministrative law is made by agencies which are members of the execu-
*Member of the Fairfax, Virginia, Bar.
2U. S. Const., Art. I.2UT. S. Const., Art. II.
"See Clark, The Science of Law and Lawmaking (1896) i et seq.
'See Cohen, Law And the Social Order (1933) 112; Frank, Law and The Modem
Mind (193o) 32.
J. S. Reports, Federal Reporter, Federal Cases and Federal Supplement.
6See Cohen, Law and the Social Order (1933) 117; Stone, The Province and
Foundation of Law (1946) 168.
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tive department, possess legislative powers and on occasion behave pre-
cisely like courts of law.7
Congress has long provided administrative agencies with rule-
making power;s that is, the power to formulate statements designed
to implement, interpret or prescribe law or policy.9 Surely such a power
is legislative in character and constitutes a re-delegation of the legisla-
tive power given exclusively to Congress by the Constitution. Congress
has empowered many agencies to issue orders by a process known as
adjudication' 0 -to apply sanctions and to grant relief." The handing
down of orders, the imposition of sanctions and the granting of re-
lief,' 2 before the advent of administrative law, would surely have been
considered exclusively in the judicial province.
As one might expect, the same objection leveled against court-made
7See Blachly and Oatman, Administrative Legislation and Adjudication (1934),
passim.
8E.g., The Interstate Commerce Commission in 1920. 41 Stat. 498 (192o).
OThe term "rule-making power" is used advisedly. The term is defined in the
Administrative Procedure Act as the process of formulation, amendment or repeal
of a rule. A rule is defined as "the whole or any part of any agency statement of
general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret,
or prescribe law or policy or to describe the organization, procedure, or practice re-
quirements of any agency " (italics added) 5 U. S. C. iooi (c) (1940). The Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act divides administrative action into only two categories:
(i) rule-making (2) adjudication. It is interesting to note that this corresponds with
Professor James Hart's division of the field in President's Committee on Administra-
tive Management, Report With Special Studies 319 (1937), where he divided the
field into: (i) the power to prescribe rules (2) to the power to determine condi-
tions upon which contingent statutes will become operative. Blachly and Oatman
worked out a much more involved system of classification. See Sabotage of the Ad-
ministrative Process, Public Administration Review (1946).
"0E.g., The Federal Trade Commission. See President's Committee on Adminis-
trative Management, Report with Special Studies (1937) 332.
""Adjudication" is defined by the Administrative Procedure Act as the agency
process for the formulation of an order. An order is defined as "the whole or any
part of the final disposition (whether affirmative, negative, injunctive or declara-
tory in form) of any agency in any matter other than rule-making " 5 U. S. C.
lOO (d) (1940).
""Sanction" includes the whole or part of any agency (i) prohibition, require-
ment, limitation, or other condition affecting the freedom of any person; (2) with-
holding of relief; (3) imposition of any form of penalty or fine; (4) destruction,
taking, seizure, or withholding of property; (5) assessment of damages, reimburse-
ment, restitution, compensation, costs, charges, or fees; (6) requirement, revocation,
or suspension of a license; or (7) taking of other compulsory or restrictive action.
"Relief" includes the whole or part of any agency (i) grant of money, assistance,
license, authority, exemption, exception, privilege, or remedy; (2) recognition of
any claim, right, immunity, privilege, exemption, or exception; or (3) taking of any
other action upon the application or petition of, and beneficial to, any person. 5
U. S. C. 1001 (1940).
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law- the objection that such law is retroactive or ex post facto'3 in
effect, has been made to administrative adjudications.' 4 As one of the
agencies which has the power to make law by the application of sanc-
tions and the granting of relief through the process of adjudication, the
Securities and Exchange Commission has come in for its share of criti-
cism.
The SEC also has the power to make law by the legislative process
of rule-making.' 5 The existence of this legislative law-making power
side by side, in the same agency, with judicial law-making power has
posed a problem of propriety new to our jurisprudence:
Should the ex post facto aspect of judge-made law be tolerated
when the law-making agency could avoid such retroactive effect
by formulating under its legislative rule-making power a rule of
only prospective applicatzon?
The problem was brought under judicial scrutiny recently by the
two Chenery Corporation cases. 16 The story goes back to November 8,
1937, when the Federal Water Service Corporation registered with the
SEC as a public utility holding company. During the ensuing four
years, while reorganization plans were in formulation pursuant to
sections 7 and 1i (3) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act,'7
certain members of Federal's management individually acquired rough-
ly io% of Federal's preferred stock in the over-the-counter market.' 8 Al-
though the purchases were at considerably less than book value, and ad-
mittedly were designed to ensure control of the new company and to
produce personal profits,19 nothing in the Holding Company Act 20 nor
any SEC rule forbade such trading. However, the SEC, even though
making no contention of bad faith or concealment, refused to approve
any plan which allowed management to exchange shares so acquired
I-The term "ex post facto" has been used throughout as synonymous with retro-
active. This is the meaning used by Austin. See Lectures on Jurisprudence (Campbell
ed. 1875) passim.
"-See Pound, Administrative Law (1942) 97; Stone, Law And Its Administration
(1915) 25 et seq.
"2"The Commission shall have power to make, amend, rescind. rules, regula-
tions and such orders as shall be necessary to carry out the policy of this chapter."
15 U. S. C. 79 t (1940).
"SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 8o, 63 S. Ct. 454, 87 L. ed. 626 (1943); SEC v.
Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 67 S. Ct. 1575, 91 L. ed. 1995 (1947); Note (1949) 62
Harv. L. Rev. 478.
1715 U. S. C. 79g, 79k (e) (194o).
286 officers and directors participated in the purchases. See SEC v. Chenery Corp.,
332 U. S. 194, 21o, 67 S. Ct. 1575, 176o, 91 L. ed. 1995, 2oo6 (1947).
"See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 8o, 85, 63 S. Ct. 454, 458, 87 L. ed. 626,
631 (1943)-
2015 U. S. C. 79a-79z-6 (194o).
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ratably with other stockholders for new-company common stock. 21 The
reorganization plan finally passed by the SEC required officers to sur-
render the shares they had acquired pending reorganization for cost
plus four per cent interest.22 The Chenery Corporation, a personal
holding company controlled by Federal's president, petitioned the
Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, which set aside that part
of the SEC's order denying management equal participation with
other stockholders in the exchange of old-company preferred for new-
company common.23
Upon certiorari2 4 the Supreme Court affirmed.25 The Court found
that the judicial precedents cited by the SEC did not sustain its conclu-
sions, 26 and reiterated that a court cannot affirm the holding of an ad-
ministrative agency which has reached a correct result by specious
reasoning.2 7 Mr. Justice Frankfurter then went on to state a prin-
ciple that it is the province of administrative agencies to base their
adjudications upon accumulated administrative experience rather
than upon judicial precedent.28 He added by implication that had the
SEC promulgated a rule under its rule-making power, and had this
been an application of such a rule, the Court would readily have up-
held the SEC's judgment.29 Mr. Justice Black disagreed all around.
First, he found the cases cited by the SEC did support its position, and
secondly, he saw no reason for reversing the SEC merely because it had
thrown in a few cases to buttress its own administrative judgment30
nFederal Water Service Corp., 8 SEC 893 (1941).
2Federal Water Service Corp., io SEC 200 (1941).
'Chenery Corp v. SEC, 75 App. D. C. 374, 128 F. (2d) 303 (1942); Note (1942)
56 Harv. L. Rev. 126.
'317 U. S. 6o9, 63 S. Ct. 52, 87 L. ed. 494 (1942).
25SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 8o, 63 S. Ct. 454, 87 L. ed. 626 (1943); Note
(1943) 56 Harv. L. Rev. 1oo2.
'6Professor E. M. Dodd in Note (1943) 56 Harv. L. Rev. 1oo2, ioo4 suggested that
the Court here required a different standard of law-making than it would have
required of a court. He pointed out that the cases cited by the SEC where lower
Federal Courts denied compensation to participants in a corporate reorganization
under Sec. 77B of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 because they traded in corporate
stock during reorganization, were very similar to the order of the SEC. Professor
Dodd's contention may be borne out by the fact that the second time up the SEC's
order was affirmed when it was based on administrative experience rather than
judicial precedent.
"SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 8o, 94, 63 Sup. Ct. 454, 462, 87 L. ed. 626, 636
(1943); See U. S. v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul R. R., 294 U. S. 499, 511, 55
S. Ct. 462, 467, 79 L. ed. 1023, 1032 (1935).
2SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 8o, 93, 63 Sup. Ct. 454, 462, 87 L. ed. 626,
636 (1943).
9318 U. S. 8o, 92, 63 Sup. Ct. 458, 461, 87 L. ed. 626, 635 (1943).
30318 U. S. 8o, 95, 63 Sup. Ct. 458, 463, 87 L. ed. 626, 637 (1943).
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Upon the remand, the SEC, relying this time upon its administra-
tive experience rather than upon judicial precedent, reached the identi-
cal result.3' The Chenery Corporation again applied to the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia, and again that court, in reliance
upon the mandate of the Supreme Court, reversed the SEC.32
The Supreme Court granted certiorari 33 a second time, and this
time it reversed the Court of Appeals34 and sustained the second
adjudication of the SEC. Through Mr. Justice Murphy the Court said
that the judgment of the SEC, supported by its cumulative administra-
tive experience in the field of reorganization, was no abuse of discre-
tion. The Court then went on to approve the action of the SEC in
creating a new standard for governing future conduct by an ad hoc ad-
judication-approved the SEC's proceeding by order rather than by
rule33,-regardless of the incidental retroactive or ex post facto effect
upon the officers of Federal Water Service Corporation.386
Practically all of the disagreement between the justices in the two
Chenery Corporation cases has centered around the ex post facto as-
pect of the action of the SEC in proceeding by order rather than by
rule. Had the SEC published a rule and applied it thereafter to this
case, the rule would have been sustained in the first instance.3 7 The
SEC, however, felt that it lacked adequate experience with this prob-
lem to warrant crystalizing its present judgment into a hard-and-fast
"'Federal Water Service Corp., Holding Company Act Release No. 5584. (Feb.
7, 1945)-
mChenery Corp. v. SEC, 8o App. D. C. 365, 154 F. (2d) 6 (1946); Note (1947)
1 Rutgers L. Rev. 146.
3328 U. S. 829, 66 S. Ct. i025, go L. ed. 16o6 (1946).
SSEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 67 S. Ct. 1575, gi L. ed. 1995 (1947).
'332 U. S. 194, 203, 67 S. Ct. 1575, 1581, gi L. ed. 1995, 2003 (1947).
uThe order certainly had an ex post facto effect upon the officers of Federal Water
Service Corporation. Before the SEC's order, although it had frequently been stated
that corporate officers are fiduciaries-e.g., Burnes Nat. Bank v. Mueller-Keller
Candy Co., 86 F. (2d) 252, 254 (C. C. A. 8th, 1936); 3 Fletcher, Corporations 838
(1931)-no barrer had been erected against open and above-board dealings in
corporate stock by officers with their corporation, Chatz v. Midco Oil Corp., i52
F. (2d) 153 (C. C. A. 7 th, 1945), cert. denied, 329 U. S. 717, 67 S. Ct. 49, 91 L. ed.
38 (1946); Keely v. Black, gi N. J. Eq. 520, 112 At. 22 (1920), with the one execep-
tion contained in the Holding Company Act itself. 15 U. S. C. 79q(b) (1940). Neither
had there been any objection by the majority view to stock transactions between
officers and stockholders, provided there was no showing of bad faith or misrepre-
sentation. Anderson v. Lloyd, 64 Idaho 768, 139 P (2d) 244 (1943). Even the stricter
minority view went no further than to throw upon officers the further burden of
proving good faith and full disclosure. Nichol v. Sensenbrenner, 22o Wis. 165, 263
N. W. 650 (1935). A fortiori over-the-counter trading has heretofore escaped cen-
sure. See Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 362, 186 N. E. 659, 661 (1933).
87See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 8o, 92, 63 S. Ct. 458, 461, 87 L. ed. 626, 635
(1943).
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rule,3 8 and furthermore, since no rule existed when this case arose, even
had such a rule been published it presumably would not have applied
to this case.3 9 Hence the SEC chose to use its power to make law by
the process of adjudication. In other words, the SEC made a new law
as a court would have made a new law.
The powers conferred by Congress upon the SEC were advisedly
broad.40 The Holding Company Act was designed to provide a broad
framework which could be eked out by rules and varied by the SEC to
meet new situations, hence obviating the ceaseless amendment re-
quired by earlier administrative acts.41 To implement this policy Con-
gress provided the SEC with power to make rules of general appli-
cation and to grant relief and to apply sanctions through adjudi-
cations.
42
When a Court makes a new law it is inevitably retroactive in effect.
43
When an administrative agency possessing rule-making power makes
a new law it is not inevitably retroactive, for the administrative agency
can use its legislative power to make a rule for future application, while
adjudicating the case at bar under existing law.
Is the ex post facto aspect of a new administrative standard of con-
duct created by order a sufficient evil to requtre the administrative
agency to use its rule-making power instead? The position of Justices
Frankfurter and Jackson in the Chenery Corporation cases seems to be
that it is.44 This is not a recent conviction of Justice Frankfurter,45 but
it is interesting to note that Justice Jackson was once publicly associated
with the other point of view.
46
Justice Jackson charged in the second Chenery case that the Court
18SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 202, 67 S. Ct. 1575, i58o, 91 L. ed. 1995,
2002 (1947).
nRules apply only prospectively. See note 9, supra.
"°See Cushman, The Independent Regulatory Commissions (1941) 36; Landis,
The Administrative Process (1938) 66.
"See Landis, The Administrative Process (1938) 68.
15 U. S. C. 79t (194o)•
"See I Austin, Jurisprudence (Campbell ed. 1875) 487; Salmond, Jurisprudence
(ioth ed. 1947) 165.
"This is substantially Professor Dodd's characterization of Frankfurter's opinion
in the first Chenery case. See Note (1943) 56 Harv. L. Rev. ioo2, i005.
"In Colyer v. Skeffington, 265 Fed. 17 (D. Mass. 192o) Mr. Felix Frankfurer filed
a brief amicus curiae, contending that an administrative agency may not repeal an
existing rule so as to affect the result in a particular case.
"6"It is recognized, however, that administrative agencies, like the courts, must
often develop their jurisprudence in a piecemeal manner, through case-by-case con-
sideration of particularized controversies." See Final Report of the Attorney Gen-
eral's Committee on Administrative Procedure (194i) 29, published over the signa-
ture of Attorney General Robert H. Jackson.
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has changed its prevailing philosophy since the first Chenery case.47
There seems a great deal of merit in Justice Jackson's argument. In
the first Chenery case the Court said, through Justice Frankfurter,
"But before transactions otherwise legal can be outlawed or denied
their usual business consequences, they must fall under the ban of some
standards of conduct prescribed by an agency of government authorized
to prescribe such standards." 48 In the Second Chenery case Justice Jack-
son argues, with Justice Frankfurter's concurrence, that this statement
was a part of the holding of the first Chenery case, 49 and there is no
doubt that it was so regarded by Justice Frankfurter when he wrote
the opinion. The majority of the Court, however, speaking through
Mr. Justice Murphy, said that the first Chenery case, ". held no more
and no less than that the Commission's first order was unsupportable
for the reasons supplied by that agency." 50 The truth of the matter
is that, while all but one of the individual justices stuck by their guns,
a change in Court personnel elevated the dissenters of the first Chenery
case to the majority in the second Chenery case.51 The Court then
simply followed the old ruse of narrowly construing a prior decision
so as to avoid the necessity of overruling itself.
There are other reasons why the making of law during the decision
of a particular case can be considered objectionable. Justice Jackson put
his finger on one of them when he quoted Cardozo's statement, "Law as
a guide to conduct is reduced to the level of mere futility if it is un-
known and unknowable."5 2 Another objection is that a rule laid down
during the decision of a particular case is seldom comprehensive, for it
is apt to be too narrow or too broad because of the peculiarities of the
'7SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 210, 67 S. Ct. 1575, 176o, 9x L. ed. 1995,
2006 (1947).
48SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 80, 92, 63 S. Ct. 454, 461, 87 L. ed. 626, 635
(1943).
"SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 212, 67 S. Ct. 1575, 1761, 91 L. ed. 1995,
2007 (1947).
0332 U. S. 194, 2oo, 67 S. Ct. 1575, 1579, 91 L. ed. 1995, 2oo1 (1947).
First Chenery Case Second Chenery Case
MAJORITY DISSENTERS MAJORITY DISSENTERS
Frankfurter Black Black Frankfurter




'OSEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 217, 67 S. Ct. 1575, 1763, 91 L. ed. 1995,
2010 (1947).
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case at bar.53 A fourth objection is that judge-made law is generally
made and applied in haste, without opportunity for hearings, confer-
ence and study.
54
Of course, these objections applied to court-made law before ad-
ministrative law was thought of. But Anglo-American jurists, while
recognizing the validity of the objections, have still had relatively lit-
tle criticism of court-made law. The critics have immediately realized
that criticism of law-making by courts is criticism of the common-law
system itself.55
The common-law system, however, could probably have got along
nicely without the addition of ad hoc adjudications by administrative
agencies. When ex post facto effect could so easily have been avoided by
using rule-making power, at the expense of only a little administrative
convenience and of letting one act which the agency deemed reprehen-
sible go unpunished, then it is difficult to see why the agency should
not have been required to use its rule-making power. Allowing the SEC
to proceed as it did in this case has given convenience the upper hand
over traditional safeguards of personal rights. Opposition to ex post
facto laws has been a part of the American tradition-the prohibition
is written into the Constitution.56 Even ,declaratory laws passed by
the legislative process have been denied retroactive effects
7
But the Supreme Court has opened the door, with only a hint that
it may be partly closed in the future.58 That which has been so long
tolerated from judges will now be tolerated from administrative
agencies. The bright spot in the picture is the remarkable restraint
practiced by the administrative agencies since the Chenery ruling.59
Perhaps the power will not be carried too far.
OSee Blachly & Oatman, Administrative Legislation and Adjudication (1934) 50.
5'See Austin, Jurisprudence (Campbell ed. 1875).
5Austin, Jurisprudence (Campbell ed. 1875) 18o; Stone, Law And Its Admin-
istration (1915) 45; Vinogradoff, Common Sense In The Law (1914) 207.
51U. S. Const., Art. i, § 9.
5Ogden v. Blackledge, 2 Cranch 272 (U. S. 18o4).
5"Since the Commission, unlike a court, does have the ability to make law
prospectively through the exercise of its rule-making powers, it has less reason to
rely upon ad hoc adjudication to formulate new standards of conduct " [italics
added] SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 202, 67 S. Ct. 1575, i58o, 91 L. ed. 1995,
2002 (1947).
"In Cities Service Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 7720 (October i,
1947), and again in American States Utilities Corp., SEC Holding Company Act
Release No. 7721 (October 3, 1947) the SEC passed up two opportunities for ex-
tending the rule formulated by order in Federal Water Service, SEC Holding Com-
pany Act Release No. 5584 (Feb. 7, 1945) and approved in the second Chenery case,
supra. The SEC in the Cities Service Co. and American States Utilities Corp. cases
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confined the Federal Water Service rule to the situation where there is: (i) a con-
certed purchase program by management; (2) a motive to acquire voting power; (3)
a large scale of trading. Further, in Cities Service Co., the SEC included a promise
to publish a rule of general application under its rule-making power as soon as
possible. See SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 7720 (October 1, 1947) 16.
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